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Abstract: Water resource allocation is a process of assessing and determining a mechanism
on how water should be distributed among different regions, sectors and users. Over
the recent decades, optimal solution for water resource allocation has been explored both
in centralised and decentralised mechanisms. Conventional approaches are under central
planner suggesting a solution which maximises total welfare to the users. Moving towards
the decentralised modelling, the techniques consider individuals as if they act selfishly
in their own favour. While central planner provides an efficient solution, it may not be
acceptable for some selfish agents. The contrary is true as well in decentralised solution,
where the solution lacks efficiency leading to an inefficient usage of provided resources.
This paper develops a parallel evolutionary search algorithm to introduce a mechanism in
re-distributing the central planner revenue value among the competing agents based on their
contribution to the central solution. The result maintains the efficiency and is used as an
incentive for calculating a fair revenue for each agent. The framework is demonstrated
and discussed to allocate water resources along the Nile river basin, where there exist
eleven competing users represented as agents in various sectors with upstream-downstream
relationship and different water demands and availability.
Keywords: Agent based problems; water resource allocation; Nile river; evolutionary
algorithm
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1. Introduction and background Water scarcity, population growth and lack of proper resource
allocation mechanism tend to cause regional instability [1]. A typical example concerns the northern
African countries within Nile basin located in the most arid region of the world, where an unfair
distribution of water resources is present for a long time. Introducing a fair mechanism for water
allocation can help the region’s economy and political stability. Standard water management approaches
model the whole water basin as a centralised system and distribute water by a central planner (CP)
to maximise the summation of all users’ utilities [2,3]. The water in this mechanism is allocated to
achieve the equal marginal return to water for all the users. This leads to an ambiguous interpretation
of the aggregated problem; whether it proposes a planning strategy or simulates the market process
[4]. Further, the CP ignores the selfishness of competing water users and assumes the best solution
to the system would be accepted completely by all the participants. This leads to unsatisfactory
results for some users with better accessibility to the resources asking for a higher revenue distribution.
To address the idealisation and oversimplification involved in the water basin management issues,
decentralised planning (DC) is introduced. [5] implement a priority based sequential algorithm for
upstream-downstream water reallocation. Once the upstream user solves its own problem, the solution
is included to the next downstream user’s problem and this continues until all the individual problems
are solved in sequence. The applicability of multi-agent systems have also been investigated in the field
of environmental and natural resource management as reported by [6] and [7]. In this type of approach,
each user is autonomous by itself and exchange information with other neighbour users within a system.
An example of using a multi-agent system is developed by [8], and is further extended in allocation of
water in yellow river basin [9] and is used to compare administrative and market based water allocation
[10]. This approach considers all users as individual agents making decisions by interacting with each
other and a coordinator who resolves the users’ conflict in later stages. The method implements the
modified penalty-based nonlinear program with a two-step problem. The first step finds a solution to all
individual agents with possibility of constraint infeasibility and the second step is an optimisation model
which reduces the constraint violation at the system level. In application, constraint infeasibility is
explained as either the deficit or as an agent behavioural adjustment indicator for reducing the constraint
violation [8]. From a game theoretical perspective, non-cooperative approaches have been examined in
the systems in which users involve in a game to increase their pay-off, knowing that their decisions affect
those of the other users. The approach provides insights for understanding water conflicts and is often
implemented for the games with qualitative information about the users’ payoffs [11]. Another approach
to the above problems is developed by [4]. They use the multiple complementarity problems to express
spatial externalities resulting from asymmetric access to water use for water right pricing. The individual
optimisation problem is formulated for each user with the inflow quantity given as exogenous value to
each problem as opposed to being a decision variable in centralised formulation, i.e. aggregated welfare
maximisation. The price of the demanded water is used to clear the output market and the uniform wage
rate is used to clear the labour market formulated as complementary constraints to the problem. To this
framework, introducing extra coupling constraints changes the formulation to a more general problem
framework namely, quasi variational inequality problem (i.e. a complementarity problem with shared
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constraints amongst the users [12]). The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed upon the convexity
assumption and continuously differentiable functions with diagonally dominant Jacobians [13].
Although the above decentralised tools and techniques satisfy the selfishness of each agent in
maximising its utility function to achieve higher revenue, they lead to an inefficient solution from CP
perspective. Therefore, it is desirable to follow the efficient CP solution but re-distribute the achieved
revenue to the agents in a fair way; considering, of course, that the revenue is transferable between
agents. To account for this, we define a notion of fairness based on each agent’s contribution on achieving
the CP solution. We calculate a unique solution with some favourable properties which guarantees the
cooperation maintenance. To find the agent’s impact on CP solution, as will be discussed in the next
sections, we need to know the best response of each agent on the action of the other group of agents and
vice versa, simultaneously. To realise this, we develop an evolutionary algorithm solving interrelated
optimisation problems in parallel guiding the search towards a feasible solution in a distributed manner.
This will guarantee that the contribution of each agent is properly captured for later fair revenue
distribution.
Section 2 describes the background information of Nile water basin and identifies the problem to
be addressed. The proposed methodology is outlined in Section 3. The Nile basin problem is dealt
with in Section 4 and results derived from different mechanisms are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
summarises the findings and conclude the paper.
2. Problem identification: Nile River Basin The Nile is the main vital water artery and the home to
more than 160 million people in the North Eastern region of Africa shared by eleven countries [14]. It
is 6853 kilometres in length and total area of its basin is over 3 million kilometres, covering about 10
percent of African continent [15]. There are two main tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile,
which are joined in Sudan 1.
The water contribution to the river varies greatly, from Ethiopia, which contributes the most water, to
Egypt, which have no contribution to Nile water [16]. Yet, as the lower reaches of Nile basin are mostly
arid or semiarid regions, some countries like Egypt and Sudan with a high percentage of total area of
the countries show a strong dependency upon the Nile River [17] (Table 1). The unbalance between the
inferior water availability and huge water extraction cause harmful consequences to basin stability and
regional development. Hence, an adequate water supply is often considered as a question of national
survival for many Nile riparian states [18].
The allocation of Nile water resource is complicated due to the combination of riparian’s less rainfall
and political inequality. The dependency to water resources shown in Table 1 is the degree to which the
supply of a country’s water resources is dependent on sources external to its political boundaries and can
be calculated using the relation (ARWR − IRWR)/ARWR × 100 [14]. As shown in Table 1, Sudan
and Egypt rely on the external water resources to a great extent, in which over 95% of water stems from
external sources. Overall, the water allocation within the basin is still unfair and unacceptable to many
of states along the Nile River, specially to those upstream contributing the most to the sources.
3. Preliminaries and definitions for fair resource allocation In this study, a fair and an efficient
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Figure 1. Nile river basin, its location and tributaries
Table 1. Utilisation of water diverted from Nile River among riparian countries [19,20]
Internal Actual
water water Diverted % of total Diverted
resources resources Dependancy water Resources for Use
Country (IRWR) (ARWR) Ratio from Nile
Burundi 10.06 12.54 19.75 40.9 2.3 1.77
Rwanda 9.5 13.3 28.57 17.1 1.58 1.07
Tanzania 84 96.27 12.75 N/A N/A N/A
Uganda 39 60.1 35.11 11.4 0.46 0.18
Sudan 4.0 37.8 96.13 1074 58 56
S.Sudan 26.0 49.5 65.8 1074 58 56
Egypt 1.8 58.3 96.91 990 94.7 103
Ethiopia 122 122 0 76 4.56 4.27
Eritrea 2.8 7.315 61.72 124.0 N/A N/A
Congo 900 1283 29.85 6.7 N/A N/A
Kenya 20.7 30.7 32.57 74.85 8.91 7.05
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resource allocation approach based on evolutionary algorithm (EA) is proposed. To retain the efficient
centralised solution whilst the achieved revenue is fairly re-distributed among the agents, the impact each
agent has on the whole system should be identified. In order to know the best response of each agent
on the coalition of others, a parallel evolutionary algorithm is developed by [21,22] which enables the
agents to automatically solve their local optimisation problem, cooperating with others and the whole
system. To elaborate some key concepts mathematically, the preliminaries are as follows.
3.1. Preliminary and definitions Let I = {1 . . . n} denotes a set of agents. Assume that each agent
i controls vector xi ∈ Rni . Let x−i be a vector containing the strategies (allocation) of all agents
excluding that of the agent i. Each agent by receiving allocation xi maximises his revenue via its utility
function ui. The utility ui of the strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ or in short x = (xi, x−i) is
ui(x) = ui(xi, x−i). We define the followings.
Definition: (Central planner welfare maximisation (CP)) A solution is a social welfare
maximisation or a central planner (CP) approach if it is derived by the following optimisation problem,
x∗ = argmax
x
∑
i∈I
ui(x), (CP )
where summation is over all the utilities of the agents. This leads to a solution from an outside observer
as if he/she is responsible for the values of all agents.
Definition: (Contribution to cooperation) Define U∗ = ∑j∈I uj(x∗). Further, assume that agent i
decides to leave the cooperation and act as a singleton (or in isolation) and let U∗−i=
∑
j 6=i uj(x
∗
−i) be the
summation of all other agent’s revenue when i leaves them. We define agent i’s impact on CP solution
as,
ui = U
∗ − U∗−i,
which measures how much agent i contributes to CP solution.
Definition: (Fairness) A revenue re-distribution mechanism is fair if the revenue for each agent i
follows the following equation:
uri = αi × U
∗,
where,
αi =
ui∑
j U
∗
−j
.
This means that each agent gets an allocation based on his contribution to the CP solution. This definition
makes sense and has two indirect properties; (a) it is budget balanced; that is, the sum of all uri equals
the whole CP revenue value U∗, which in other words conveys that the mechanism collects and disburses
the same amount of money from and to the agents; and, (b) it is rational; that is, no agent ever loses
by participation (the revenue to each user is greater than zero). The above explains that the more
contribution one agent has, the higher its revenue is. In this case, agents are encouraged to abide by
the decision derived by CP problem (x∗) if they are given a revenue following uri values.
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U∗−i implies that agent i, which left the set of all agents, independently compete on the resources
with agents {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n}. If agent i knew the others’ strategies, his strategic problem
would become simple; he would be left with the single-agent problem of choosing a utility-maximising
problem. However, the two problems formed by agent i and agents {1, 2, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , n} should be
solved, simultaneously. This is because of the fact that agent i’s best strategy depends on the interaction
with the group he has left and which should not be ignored when finding U∗−i values. Therefore, U∗−i
depends on the solution of two interrelated maximisation problems formed by agent {i}’s utility, ui,
and agents’ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} aggregated utilities,
∑
j 6=i
j∈I
uj(x−i) which should be solved at
the same time. We will be using a parallel evolutionary technique defined next to deal with this two
distributed problems.
3.2. Parallel search algorithm Here we formulate a general class of interrelated problems in which
their optimisation problems are simultaneously solved in parallel while interacting with each other.
In a most general case and where n agents are solving their problems individually, each agent solves
one optimisation problem and seeks its own optimal strategies while interacting with the others. More
precisely, given U : Rn → Rn representing all n agents’ utilities, we find x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ by
simultaneously solving the following n problems:
Max
xi
ui(x)
subject to x ∈ Xi.
(Pi)
where each agent i controls vector xi ∈ Rni to optimise the utility (objective) function ui subject to the
constraints set Xi containing x ∈ Rn+. The interrelation is explained as the objective function and the
constraints in Pi depend on other agents’ decisions.
To solve the n agent problems Pi, i = 1, ..., n simultaneously, we dedicate each problem Pi to one
agent i. Since there is interconnection between each problem due to vector x, we solve each problem
whilst it communicates with the other problems by sharing information. Lets call P the problem formed
by all Pis. We use parallel genetic algorithm [23] and the idea of co-evolution [24] to solve P with an
extension that each (sub-)problem Pi has its own objective function. This concept is used in [25] to
gain faster convergence to Pareto solution in multiobjective optimisation problem. Let x−i be a vector
containing the decision variables of all agents involved in problem Pi excluding that of the agent i.
The search algorithm is described by n different search trajectories performing in parallel through the
following mapping H:
xt+1i = H(x
t
−i, x
t
i, Pi),
where H shows the interconnection between the agents. H acts as a synchronization map for agent i to
optimise problem Pi given the decisions of other interacting agents in its neighbourhood remain fixed
shown by xt−i. H describes that xi value is updated by a search on problem Pi at generation t linking
decisions xi and x−i. Due to problem Pi, each agent knows its own problem components and hence by
communicating with other neighbouring agents through H , it has local activity for exploring the search
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Algorithm 1: Parallel search algorithm
1 Randomly initialise n populations of size m (popi);
2 Define neighboursi and set neii = |neighboursi|;
3 Set MaxGen;
4 while Not MaxGen do
5 for i = 1 to n do
6 for k = 1 to m do
7 Randomly pick ps1 6= ps2 6= ps3 6= pk from popi;
8 pb ← reproduction (ps1, ps2, ps3);
9 if fi(pb) ≤ fi(pk) then
10 pk ← pb
11 pop∗i ← The best individual in popi;
12 ∀ i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j, popi ← pop
∗
j ∧ j ∈ neighboursi;
space. In what follows, we give details of the search algorithm to solve the agents problems in Algorithm
1.
Each agent i has a devoted search trajectory formed by a population of size m (Line 1). popi is a
m× nei matrix and is populated randomly. nei is the number of interacting agents given by the cardinal
of the set neighboursi (Line 2). In other words nei equals the number of neighbouring agents affecting
the decision of agent i plus one. All individuals pk = (x1, ..., xnei) in each population i undergoes a
reproduction in each generation t of parallel searches (Line 8). At the end of each generation t, the
neighbouring agents (j ∈ neighboursi) share their best individuals to form the updated population for
next generation t+ 1 (Line 12).
where three populations are involved with nei = 3. As explained in the figure, each agent deals with
problem Pi optimising for xi. At the end of each generation t, pop∗i , the best individual in popi based
on its objective value, is obtained. pop∗i migrates to the population of the neighbours and remain fixed
for the next generation t + 1. This makes each agent at the end of each generation to be informed of
the decisions of the other neighbouring agents involved in its own problem. Due to n different search
trajectories, the algorithm allows independent search for agents by relying only on locally available
information. This procedure leads to the evolution of separate populations over successive generations,
and the convergence is assumed when the agents cannot further improve their objective function values
fi.
3.3. Resource allocation context As stated earlier, to find the contribution ui of each agent i to the CP
solution, we need to assure that the solution to agent i’s utility maximisation is the best response to the
solution of sum of utilities of the other agents and vice versa. To do so, we split the set I by removing
one agent at a time from I to form two problems P1 and P2 for each instances. Specifically, problem
P1 is the utility maximisation for agent i (ui) and problem P2 is the aggregated utility maximisation for
Water 2015, xx 8
Algorithm 2: Steps to redistribute utilities amongst self-interested agents
1 Find U∗;
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Solve problem P1 and P2 using Algorithm 1;
4 For each agent i, calculate ui, αi;
5 uri ← αi × U
∗;
6 Distribute to each agent uri ;
agents 1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n (∑j 6=i
j∈I
uj(x−i)). Problem P1 and P2 are then solved in parallel for
each agent i using Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 summarises the steps to obtain a fair resource allocation to
different self-interested agents.
4. Nile river basin water sharing mechanism Considering the major water utilisation of riparian
and their geographic positions Figure 1 illustrated in Section 2, the water users located in the Nile
riparian states are modelled as agents within a distribution network. The objective function for each
agent is the economic outcome of its water abstraction shown by aixi − bix2i . The economic function
is a simple quadratic function calculated by integrating the linear water demand functions for each
agent [21] (For details the reader is referred to [2,26,27]). All agents follow the upstream-downstream
relationship, interconnecting with neighbours using the mass balance equations. The CP model aims at
the maximisation of total benefit, and is formulated as a single optimisation problem with summation
of all benefit functions as in Equation CP. Following Section 3.3, for the decentralised model, agent i is
separated from the rest of the agents and its own economic function is maximised concurrently as the
rest try to maximise their group revenue using Algorithm 1.
4.1. Water availability The mean annual flow of Nile River in 2015 is 84 billion cubic metre (BCM) per
year [28]. In this case-specific modelling, the minor water inflows and evaporative losses are considered
negligible. Specific to the two tributaries, hydrological data at Mogren dam is chosen to represent
average annual runoff of the White Nile (Q1) and Khartoum monitors data of the Blue Nile (Q2) [19].
In experimental set-up, therefore, Q1=24.0 BCM and, Q2=60.0 BCM based on the average hydrological
data regulated at these stations [29].
4.2. Population and demand values The objective function is the benefit function that quantifies the total
benefit generated by water extractors from water use. In order to set reasonable value for the parameters
ai and bi in objective function, the water demand curves should be estimated primarily according to
the water demand and price, and then total benefit functions are calculated by integrating the demand
functions. Following [2], the point expansion method is used to estimate the linear demand curve for
various sectors [2]. The original point of expansion is based on the total water consumption and the
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water price. For simplicity, the marginal value of water is referenced as water price. Water consumption
is obtained using:
Water demand = total water usage× % of population within the basin
Table 2 exhibits the factors determining the total water demand in the basin amongst agents.
Table 2. Water consumption within the basin [17,19]
Population within % of total Water usage Water demand
Agent Sectors the basin(million) population (BCM) with the basin(BCM) Source
A Agriculture 4.88 44.50% 0.22 0.0979 1
B Agriculture 8.17 69.40% 0.1 0.0694 1
C Agriculture 8.24 16.70% 4.632 0.7749 1
D Agriculture 2.8 4.10% 0.11 0.0046 1
E Industry 30.28 76.40% 0.12 0.0917 1
F Agriculture 14.62 33.00% 1.01 0.3329 1
G Energy 10 85.50% 0.21 0.1818 1
H Agriculture 29.56 31.40% 5.204 1.6347 2
I Agriculture 0.21 3.30% 0.29 0.0096 2
J Agriculture 20 29.60% 6.56 1.9445 1+2
K Municipal 51 62.20% 5.3 3.2941 1+2
The population within the basin, water usage for utilisation and their marginal values are the main
benchmarks when determining the water demand curves, which are indirectly reflected on parameters
setting in objective functions [14]. Based on Table 2, from agent A to K, a = [100, 100, 100, 100, 1860,
100, 13000, 100, 100, 100, 1300], and b = [511, 721, 65, 10960, 10139, 150, 35757, 31, 5200, 26, 197].
5. results and discussion In both CP and decentralised solution procedure, MaxGen=100 in Algorithm
1, population size for each agent is set as m=50 and cross over and mutation is set as 0.5 and 0.7,
respectively. Accounting for reliability, all the instances are run for 30 times and their average value is
reported.
5.1. Centralised solution In CP model, the fitness function is the aggregated benefit of all countries and,
therefore, the problem is to search the maximum value of system revenue . The revenue of the whole
system is reported as 3575.94 B. The benefits of each agent i in CP solution are shown in Table 3 along
with the amount of water abstracted.
5.2. Decentralised solution Eleven different model instances are solved where in each single instance,
two problems are optimised in parallel using Algorithm 1. Table 4 reports the results.
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Table 3. Water resource allocation results in centralised manner (CP). Burundi(A),
Rwanda(B), Tanzania(C), Congo(D), Uganda(E), Kenya(F), S.Sudan(G), Ethiopia(H),
Eritrea(I), Sudan(J) , Egypt(K)
Agent A B C D E F G H I J K
Water (bcm) 0.1 0.04 0.54 0 0.08 0.17 0.16 1.24 0 1.72 2.85
Benefit (mGBP) 4.9 2.8 35 0 84.7 12.5 1159.5 76.3 0 95.1 2105.1
Total benefit U∗ =
∑
u∗i = 3575.94
2%
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4%
2%
27%
3%
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Figure 2. Percentages of contribution in cooperation
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Re-Distributed Solution
CP Solution
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Figure 3. Revenue allocation results in CP solution and reallocation solution
5.2.1. Re-allocation solution
After finding the decentralised solution, from the perspective of fairness, we reallocate the system
revenue based on the results derived from CP solution (Table 3). Figure 2 shows the contributions
of each agent. The difference between the CP value and the group value of the rest in decentralised
model embodies the impact one agent has on the whole system. Hence, the contribution is calculated,
which provides the basis for revenue re-distribution. The incentive of agents in a cooperation game is
determined by their location. The downstream users with high water dependency usually have higher
incentive to join the cooperation. Figure 3 compares the decentralised solution with the CP distribution.
For example, agent C contributes more than its upstream user B since it has less access to the water
resource yet it requires more water resources. It can be seen that upstream location is beneficial to
agents compared with the CP solution. Agent A, Burundi, who has the independent water resource
as the upstream of White Nile tributary (Q1), could increase its final obtainable benefit greatly from
4.9 to 61.16 in million pounds. This is the same for the other upstream users, while on contrary,
the two main downstream water abstractors, agent G and K, are apportioned with less water after
re-distribution. Through the rearrangement of water allocation, the upstream-downstream water disputes
has the potential to be reduced. In addition, the distribution tends to be more evenly among agents than
that in CP solution, which could be explained as the reflection of fairness to some extent.
6. Conclusion and future work This paper seeks to address river Nile water distribution problem
through a revenue re-distribution mechanism to achieve a fair resource allocation. The proposed
framework leads to a final allocated revenue for each user which is proportional to its contribution to
the basin. In centralised solution, aggregated benefits of all water users is used to search the optimal
system revenue and in decentralised solution, a parallel evolutionary approach is developed to find the
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Table 4. Water resource allocation results
Parallel Contribution Singleton Group Fairness Final
Agent Country Problems u¯i P1 P2 αi Revenue uri
A Burundi {A}{BCDEFGHIJK} 76.94 4.89 3499 0.017 61.16
B Rwanda {B}{ACDEFGHIJK} 75.94 2.802 3500 0.017 60.37
C Tanzania {C}{ABDEFGHIJK} 219.94 35 3356 0.049 174.84
D Congo {D}{ABCEFGHIJK} 86.94 0 3489 0.019 69.11
E Uganda {E}{ABCDFGHIJK} 157.94 85.09 3418 0.035 125.55
F Kenya {F}{ABCDEGHIJK} 81.94 13.01 3494 0.018 65.14
G S.Sudan {G}{ABCDEFHIJK} 1226.94 1168 2349 0.273 975.35
H Ethiopia {H}{ABCDEFGIJK} 139.94 76.37 3436 0.031 111.24
I Eritrea {I}{ABCDEFGHJK} 45.94 0 3530 0.01 36.52
J Sudan {J}{ABCDEFGHIK} 168.94 96.01 3407 0.038 134.3
K Egypt {K}{ABCDEFGHIJ} 2216.94 1947 1359 0.493 1762.35
contribution of each user to the whole system. The evolutionary algorithm is a parallel search where each
user solve its own problem while in contact with the others. Re-allocation of revenue in this framework
guarantees a fair and an efficient allocation of water to all users. Geographical location of users as well as
their sector they are involved in (manifested via different marginal values) are the main factors affecting
the final available revenue for water users which in turn determine their contributions. Compared with
centralised solution, the results have taken into account the selfishness of individuals providing a fairer
distribution of water to those with greater accessibility to the water. The revenue distribution mechanism
introduced in this paper is a fair and unique approach but its stability requires further investigation. In
addition, the algorithmic characteristics of the proposed framework still needs to be explored. Future
research can analyse the technique for feasibility assurance and possibly faster convergence by using
different operators and heuristics. In addition, since n instances of problems are independent from each
other, a parallelisation scheme can be implemented.
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